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CORRUPTION AND LEGITIMATION CRISES IN
LATIN AMERICA
Angel Ricardo Oquendo*

I.

INTRODUCTION

It is all too evident that a pervasive corruption problem may
undermine a government's legitimacy. Citizens lose faith in political and
legal institutions and may become cynical or rebel. Ultimately, the very
survival of the system may be at stake. This paper deals with these issues
but at a rather specific conceptual level. In particular, I intend to explore
the notion of a legitimation crisis and its implications for the issue of
political corruption in Latin America. This exercise will make it possible
to understand more precisely how it is that corrupt practices debilitate the
state's claim to justification.
It was Joel Paul who suggested that I address this topic at the
Connecticut Journal of International Law's conference entitled "Political
Corruption in Market Democracies." ' I must confess that my initial
reaction was one of puzzlement. After all, German philosopher Jtirgen
Habermas originally applied the notion of a legitimation crisis to
developed or even over-developed countries. Habermas, in fact, called the
book that introduces the terminology Legitimation Problems in Late
Capitalism.2 It was Thomas McCarthy's translation that rendered the title
simply Legitimation Crisis.3 How could such a notion apply to present* Professor of Law, University of Connecticut School of Law. Ph.D., 1995, M.A., 1995, A.B., 1983,
Harvard University; J.D., 1986, Yale University. I would like to say thanks to Peter Goldstone and
Ernesto Garz6n Valdrs for their helpful insights.
1. The event took place on November 12-14, 1998, at the University of Connecticut School of
Law in Hartford, Connecticut. Please see Symposium articles/speeches published concurrently in this
volume.
2. JORGEN HABERMAS, LEGITIMATIONSPROBLEME IM SPATKAPITALISMUS (1973) [hereinafter
HABERMAS, LEGITIMATIONSPROBLEME].
See LESLIE HOLMES, THE END OF COMMUNIST POWER:
ANTI-CORRUPTION CAMPAIGNS AND LEGITIMATION CRISIS 28 (1993) ("As the German title suggests,
Habermas' book is explicitly and primarily concerned with advanced industrial society organized
along predominantly capitalist lines.").
3. JURGEN HABERMAS, LEGITIMATION CRISIS (Thomas McCarthy, trans., 1975) [hereinafter
HABERMAS, LEGITIMATION].
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day Latin American nations, which are the quintessence of
underdeveloped - or, more euphemistically, "developing," and, up to
several months ago, even considered "emerging" - economies? These
countries have in the last decade experienced, contrary to the proverbial
late capitalism, a drastic reduction rather than an expansion of state
intervention. Instead of instituting the welfare state, these polities have
been in the business of dismantling anything bearing it even the slightest
resemblance.
It occurred to me at first that in deploying this concept with heavy
Marxist overtones in an underdeveloped context which had yet to meet the
conditions of application,4 Joel was just displaying his Leninist
inclinations - of course, Leninism with a human face. Upon deeper
reflection, I realized that the notion of a legitimation crisis does indeed
illuminate the problem of corruption in Latin America. If properly
reinterpreted, the concept enables one to understand political corruption as
an endemic threat to the normative identity of society. The appropriate
response, accordingly, cannot be simply technical - such as the enactment
of tougher laws or the implementation of more effective enforcement
mechanisms. Nor can it be merely motivational, in the sense not of
Habermas but rather of U.S. psychologist David McClelland.5 That is, one
cannot just seek to change the attitude or the prevailing professional
culture in civil service. Instead, the challenge is to transform the way in
which Latin American communities understand themselves, particularly
the normative premises of their social integration. In other words, a
metamorphosis of the underlying democratic principles is necessary.
II.

CRISIS

Let me get to work here. I should first note that the expression
"legitimation crisis" appears in conjunction with the issue of corruption in
a book edited by Leslie Holmes entitled The End of Communist Power:
Anti-Corruption Campaigns and Legitimation Crisis.6 The subject matter
there is, of course, the battle against corruption in the former Soviet block.
Yet, the reasons Holmes invokes for applying the concept of legitimation
crisis beyond the iron curtain are not relevant to Latin America. She
avers, in particular, that by loosening their grip on the economy, Eastern
European Communist governments were effectively contradicting their
4.
5.

See HABERMAS, LEGITIMATIONSPROBLEME, supra note 2, at 10-11.
Compare DAVID C. MCCLELLAND, HUMAN MOTIVATION (1988); DAVID C. MCCLELLAND,

ACHIEVEMENT MOTIVE (1980);
READINGS (1973);

DAVID

C.

DAVID C. MCCLELLAND,

MCCLELLAND,

HUMAN MOTIVATION:

MOTIVATING ECONOMIC ACHIEVEMENT

HABERMAS, LEGITIMATIONSPROBLEME, supra note 2, at 106-28 ("Motivation Crisis").
6. HOLMES, supra note 2.

A

BOOK OF

(1971) with
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own ideology, and thus losing their credibility This argument may bear
on the situation in Cuba, but not much on the rest of the Iberian American
region.8 Moreover, Holmes does not see corruption as a cause of a
legitimation crisis but rather as a concomitant development.9
I will therefore start from scratch. I will be loading on many certainly too many - tentative and undeveloped thoughts, which will
ineluctably render the presentation somewhat convoluted. By way of
compensation, I will conclude with some reflections on the direction the
discussion should take from here on. My hope is that this contribution
will be the beginning rather than the end of a debate.
Habermas begins his discussion with an examination of the medical
interpretation of the notion of a crisis. '° From this standpoint, an organism
faces a crisis when attacked by a disease - a virus or bacteria - in a way
that endangers the target's very existence. Habermas insists that when a
crisis involves human beings, a subjective dimension inevitably arises."
What he means is that in determining whether and to what extent survival
is at stake, one must take the perspective of the person herself - her notion
of well-being, of life, of who she is. At this turn, Habermas recognizes his
debt to the dramaturgical usage of the term. In this sense, "a crisis means
the turning point of a fateful process, which objectively does not either
simply break in from the outside or remain external to the identity of the
affected person.""
It is clear where Habermas is coming from. A true son of the
Frankfurt school, he is moving towards an internal application of the
concept to societies. He is continuing the process of formulating a critical
theory, modeled on Karl Marx and Sigmund Freud, which works together
with its subject in identifying the problem and in deciding what the
solution should be. In this interpretation, Marx does not offer his critique
from the point of view of someone who has stepped outside, decided how
society should function, identified current deficiencies, and proposed
specific improvements. Instead, he formulates his assessment of and
proposed solutions for the problems of capitalism internally, i.e., from the

7. Id. at 32.
8. The term "Iberian America" denominates the former New World colonies of Spain and
Portugal-the two nations on the Iberian Peninsula. Mexico and Brazil are examples. This
expression is more accurate than "Latin America", which should presumably also include once-French
possessions, such as Haiti or QuEbec, but ordinarily refers only to Iberian America. See Angel R.
Oquendo, "Reimagining the Latino/a Race," 12 HARV. BLACKLETTER J. 93, 96-99 (1995). In this
essay I use the two concepts interchangeably, following the common, albeit imprecise, usage.
9. Id. at34.
10. HABERMAS, LEGITIMATIONSPROBLEME, supra note 2, at 9.
11. Id.
12. ld. at 10.
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proletariat's perspective. Similarly, Freud supposedly does not simply
seek to gather evidence on his patients' disorders and then figure out what
the cure should be. On the contrary, he purports to work with his subjects
so that they can themselves identify the problem, find a remedy, and
determine whether the treatment has been effective. 3
Habermas generally elaborates a critical theory along similar lines. In
his earlier work he postulates an ideal speech situation through which
individuals themselves agree upon how to transform their collective
existence, guided exclusively by the force of the better argument.' 4 More
recently, he advocates discursive and deliberative democracy as a process
through which people are able reasonably
and autonomously to deal with
5
modem life's fundamental challenges.
It should therefore come as no surprise that Habermas finds the
internal or subjective notion of a crisis appealing. He readily incorporates
the concept into his societal analysis. For him, a society hits a crisis when
it confronts an onslaught on its identity and a clear prospect of extinction.
Its only hope of survival is to undergo a radical transformation. In order
to overcome the crisis, however, it will have to do more than change its
essence. It will also have to be able6 to recognize itself in its new form,
which may be a truly agonizing feat.
I could draw on the clich6 of crises being both a crossroad and an
opportunity and assert that a crisis both endangers a community and
allows it to grow. Yet, I will resist the temptation to go kitsch. I will only
say that a crisis forces its subject not only to draw on its self-preservation
instincts, but also to engage in a most demanding self-examination
exercise. The subject must reflect profoundly on who it is, and on the
limits of its identity.
III. LEGITIMATION CRISIS
Enough about crisis. What about legitimation? I think it is useful at
this point to keep in mind the notions of modernity, rationalization, and
disenchantment, which Habermas borrows from Max Weber. I'll bring
them in as I go along.
Legitimation, generally, refers to the production of norms that move
people to support social institutions. Society can, accordingly, bring its
13.

See generally, JURGEN HABERMAS,

ERKENNTNIS

UND

INTERESSE

(1973)

[hereinafter

HABERMAS, ERKENNTNIS]; RAYMOND GEUSS, THE IDEA OF CRITICAL THEORY (1981).

14.

See, e.g., HABERMAS,

KOMMUNIKATIVEN

15.

ERKENNTNIS,

supra note 13; JORGEN HABERMAS, THEORIE DES

HANDELNS (1981) [hereinafter HABERMAS, KOMMUNIKATIVEN].

See JORGEN HABERMAS, FAKTIZITAT UND GELTUNG: BEITRAGE ZUR DISKURSTHEORIE DES

RECHTS UND DES DEMOKRATISCHEN RECHTSSTAATS

16.

(1992) [hereinafter

HABERMAS, FAKTIZITAT].

See generally, HABERMAS, LEGITIMATIONSPROBLEME, supra note 2, at 9-19.
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members to comply with institutional strictures through force or through
legitimation. It usually relies, of course, on both. Yet, the more it can
persuasively claim to be legitimate, the less it will have to use repression,
and (presumably) the more stable it will be.
Following Weber, Habermas explains that in pre-modem societies,
legitimacy feeds off broadly accepted philosophical or theological
worldviews. If anybody demanded a justification for the power wielded
by social institutions, the establishment would probably appeal to
metaphysical or religious beliefs shared by all. It would perhaps maintain
that the existing order finds a "raison d'&tre" in the teachings or
commandments of the community's deity or deities."
In the modem world, however, the phenomenon described by Weber
as "disenchantment" takes place.' 8 As society becomes increasingly
complex and pluralistic, all-encompassing and monolithic worldviews will
not do. They can no longer justify in one swoop the multiplicity of
components that make up the social structure, nor, in light of the diversity
of convictions, gain the approval of the entire population.
Modem
legitimacy, therefore, rests not on mythical tales, but on independently
persuasive reasons.' 9 This conception overlaps globally with that of "basic
legitimacy" recently postulated by British philosopher Bernard Williams,
which does not exhaust political virtue but which, in Williams' words,
"implies a sense in which the state has to offer a justification of its power
to each subject."2o
Habermas takes over Weber's idea that social structure breaks down
into specialized institutions, which call for their own justificatory
resources and which must secure the allegiance of a plurality of
individuals who do not share a particular creed. Habermas adds, to this
Weberian account, the contention that there is a cognitive content to the
legitimating norms, which goes beyond their mere factual acceptance and
which makes full sense only internally."
I will now attempt to combine the two concepts of Legitimation and
Crisis. As I already intimated, according to Habermas, dysfunctions of the
kind once identified by Marx plague advanced capitalism and make
intensive state economic involvement necessary.
Inasmuch as state
controlled economic activity does not have the level of naturalness and
17.

See HABERMAS, FATKIZITAT, supra note 15, at 181.

See also MAX WEBER, WIRTSCHAFT

UND GESELLSCHAFT 16-20, 122-40, 822 (1976).
18.

See, e.g., WEBER, supra note 17, at 308.

19. See HABERMAS, KOMMUNIKATIVEN, supra note 14, at 262-98; HABERMAS, FAKTIZITAT,
supra note 15, at 42.

20.

Bernard Williams, Realism and Moralism in Political Theory 7 (Apr. 24, 1997) (manuscript

presented at the Yale Legal Theory Workshop).
21. See HABERMAS, KOMMUNIKATIVEN, supra note 14 (Band I), at 255-66.
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ready-acceptability of the market, a legitimation gap emerges. Habermas
describes the legitimation crisis at stake as follows: "The legitimating
system is not able to sustain the necessary level of mass loyalty in carrying
22
out the steering imperatives taken over from the economic system.
The idea is that, at the outset, the state presents and justifies itself as a
guarantor of the free market. Its mission is basically to preserve a
framework within which capitalist production and exchange can flourish.
As business cycles become ever more common and intense, the
government must intervene. It has to perform investment and redistribution functions in order to keep the economy going and to provide a
safety net for those disenfranchised by the workings of capitalism. In
doing so, however, it transgresses the laissez faire dogma, which until then
was its main source of legitimacy. A crisis thus emerges and persists until
the state is able to secure additional justifications for its unprecedented
role. It overcomes its predicament only when it is able to produce some
kind of welfare state or social market ideology.
Habermas underscores that this is an "identity crisis", which signifies
that society's self-understanding - that is, the set of norms through which
society interprets itself and attains social integration - is at risk. It has to
produce new norms, which ultimately might either fail to provide the
necessary legitimacy or come across as foreign and alienating. It must,
more concretely, replace the tenets of libertarianism with those of social
welfarism, and hope that the latter will not only adequately justify its
government's expanding economic incursions, but also be compatible with
its self-understanding. The endogenous form and the focus on identity are
what distinguish this crisis from the original economic crisis that launched
the entire process to begin with. Whereas the latter crisis involves
problems in system integration, the former is about difficulties in social
integration, to use the terminology that Habermas takes from David
Lockwood.23 In other words, while the economic crisis endangers
society's capacity to operate as a coherent system, the legitimation crisis
threatens its ability to act and understand itself as a fully unified
community.

supra note 2, at 68
David Lockwood, Social Integration and System Integration, EXPLORATIONS IN SOCIAL
CHANGE 244 (Zollschand & Hirsch eds., 1964), quoted in HABERMAS, LEGITiMATIONSPROBLEME,
supra note 2, at 17. The notions of social and system integration have continued to pervade even
Habermas' later work. See HABERMAS, FAKTIZITAT, supra note 15, at 46-47, 50, 51-52, 54-55, 56,
57, 58-59, 61, 65, 66, 70-71, 78, 110-11, 172-73, 217,363,450, 524,643-44.
22.
23.

HABERMAS, LEGITIMATIONSPROBLEME,
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IV. CORRUPTION AND LEGITIMATION CRISIS
At this point, I may sweep in the issue of corruption. This matter
seems, at one level, to be about system integration, i.e., about the state's
capacity to perform its compensation or coordination role in the economy.
A corrupt state is not in the position, for example, to undertake its redistributive function or to provide the needed judicial certainty in an
effective manner. That is, on the one hand, state officials constantly
embezzle the funds that the legislature appropriates for welfare programs
or, on the other hand, judicial decisions often end up being a function not
of pre-established rules, but rather of the extent to which the parties have
bribed the decision makers.
Chronic corruption may, nevertheless, additionally impinge upon
social integration. The citizenry typically loses faith in the individuals in
front of as well as the principles behind the leading political and
administrative institutions. The social cohesion and solidarity built on
those norms begin to wane. For instance, notions such as democracy, the
rule of law, or civic rights may gradually lose their appeal.
Under these circumstances, a crisis of sorts unfolds. The polity's
subsistence as a normatively consolidated unit is in peril. Above all, it is
the identity of the collectivity that is at stake. The convictions through
which the various individuals see themselves as belonging together are on
the verge of a total collapse. The government will be hard pressed to
come up with a new set of norms to justify its employees' abuses and
unify its constituents. It will gradually end up with no other option than
repression to stay in power and to keep the society from disintegrating.
This course of action, needless to say, is awfully unstable and unlikely to
be effective in the long run.
Nevertheless, this situation does not constitute a classical legitimation
crisis. Political and legal institutions are, to be sure, engaging in action for
which they lack normative backup.
Yet, they are not, as in the
paradigmatic scenario, undertaking a necessary task that overextends
existing legitimacy resources. They are instead involving themselves in
activities that are superfluous, aberrant, and intrinsically illegitimate.
A legitimation crisis of sorts emerges only when the state adopts anticorruption measures that call for additional normative cover. A serious
campaign to combat corruption may lead, for instance, to a restriction of
traditional privacy rights or to the elimination of some of the longestablished privileges of power. Political and legal institutions will,
accordingly, have to modify their ground principles so as to allow the anticorruption effort. The extent of the crisis will depend on how difficult it is
for the people to embrace these new norms.

CONNECTICUT JOURNAL OF INT'L LA W
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An anti-corruption effort along these lines will normally, at most,
entail a mini-crisis. Usually the normative readjustment required will not
seriously menace the community's identity. Under certain circumstances,
however, dealing with widespread corruption may call for an approach
that dramatically shakes up the polity. It may demand, for instance, not
simply fine-tuning, but actually radically re-interpreting the political
norms in place. The effectiveness of the anti-corruption crusade in such a
context will be a function of the state's capacity to revamp the principles
that structure the nation's politics, as well as the people's ability to
identify with the novel set of norms.
I can make the point in plain language thus: Confronted with a severe
corruption problem, a society may have to do more than pass an ethics
code or come up with reliable enforcement mechanisms. It may even have
to go beyond altering some isolated political norms. It may additionally
have to engage in a profound reflection on the principles of government.
It may need to reconfigure the premises of its political unity and selfunderstanding. This process will be arduous and, at times, traumatic.
What I have in mind is a situation in which at first the approach to
politics is mostly instrumental. Political actors generally regard the
principles of politics as instruments through which to achieve certain ends.
They treat their activity as a game. They form tactical alliances and, if
successful, divide up the spoils of battle with their allies. They thus fancy
politics as a continuation of war by other means, to flip over Clausewitz's
famous aphorism. 24 They are certainly aware that they ought to follow the
rules, but ultimately their focus is on their own objectives. They therefore
decide whether to follow the established commandments in a particular
case on the basis of whether doing so is consistent with their broader
goals.
In this picture, private citizens have a rather passive role. Their
political involvement is intermittent, limited to when elections or
referenda come up. At most other times, they hibernate politically. A key
part of the politicians' strategy, of course, consists in trying to obtain the
support of these constituents during the electoral season. The end is to get
the vote with any means available. In their pursuit of this aim, political
agents again face certain restrictions with which they must comply or else
risk facing penalties for noncompliance.
If there is a problem of rampant corruption under these circumstances,
an anti-corruption project may not be terribly useful. Political players will
tend to view the ethics prohibitions as simply an additional set of precepts

24. See generally, CARL VON CLAUSEWITZ, VOM KRIEGE (1952) ("War is nothing but a
continuation of politics by other means.").
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around which they must act. They may find ways of violating the spirit
while honoring the letter of the law or ways of simply avoiding detection.
Accordingly, the society may be hopelessly incapable of stopping the
erosion in legitimacy caused by the uncontrolled abuse of power.
In such a case, it is necessary to overhaul the instrumental in favor of
a more reflexive understanding of politics. In other words, the state
should try to move individuals to visualize their political engagement as
an end in itself. These persons will, hence, come to see politics as an
ongoing process through which the community exists as such and gives
itself the law by which it lives. This collective autonomous effort takes a
multiplicity of forms: dialogue, argument, self-definition, deliberation,
negotiation, emotional outburst, bonding, inner rivalry, as well as
gamesmanship. The latter is part of but does not dominate the political
universe. Thus, politics ceases to be merely about strategizing, and
political norms map out not an obstacle course, but an intrinsically
meaningful existential space, within which the community becomes its
own master.
From this perspective, the political world encompasses everyone, not
just politicians. The public sphere plays a crucial role in political life.
Citizens are no longer simply a source of electoral support and become,
through their civic organizations, an immanent element in the political
process. They bring forth initiatives, ideas, and criticisms. They may,
depending on the issue, work along with, against, and independently of
their representatives. They must, in any case, be an integral part of the
communal self-legislation struggle.
This reflexive approach to government corresponds to what Ernesto
Garz6n Valdrs, following H.L.A. Hart, denominates "the internal point of
view."25 Garz6n Vald6s maintains that to confront political corruption
head on, it is necessary to "make sure that decision makers adopt an
internal point of view with respect to the basic rules of the relevant
normative system. 26 He notes that taking this internal point of view
implies moving to a deeper understanding of democracy.
Corrupt acts and activities are just the tip of the iceberg. They
suggest the existence of a more profound problem: the tendency
to substitute the ideal of democratic cooperation with forms of
competition and the exercise of influence, which are radical
contradictions of the democratic ideal . . . . Thus, the

25. Ernesto Garz6n Valdds, "Acerca del concepto de la corrupci6n" 10 (unpublished manuscript,
on file with author).
26. Id. at 18.
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recuperation of modernity's democratic faith - and the
implementation of proposals to make possible a coexistence in
conditions of equality are the best means of avoiding the
disintegrating effects of corruption in democratic society.27
Garz6n Valdds would probably agree with me, then, that, in order to
come to grips with corruption, government officials, alongside the rest of
society, must sometimes rise to a reflexive conception of politics. In this
conception the underlying norms represent not externally imposed
strictures, but rather internally chosen principles of self-definition and
self-legislation.
This kind of political vision will go a long way towards creating an
atmosphere propitious for controlling corruption. Individuals in positions
of power will have an inclination to regard the parameters that regulate
their endeavors, including ethical precepts, as crucial components of a
shared communal existence and, as such, worthy of respect. Corrupt
government officials and citizens may lose not only points, but also crucial
credibility with themselves as well as with others. They will be cheating
not just the system, but themselves in a very fundamental way. Ordinary
citizens will have the tools and incentives to discover and expose the
violations. In this environment, it will be considerably easier to have a
transparent and accountable government system.
Moving towards such a conception of politics may very well bring
about a grave crisis. What is at stake is the way in which the polity
understands itself. On the one hand, it may not have the means to undergo
such a radical transformation. On the other hand, even if it does have the
capacity, it may not be able to recognize itself in its altered state. In either
case, its survival will be on the line.
This situation will entail a legitimation crisis that differs from the one
contemplated by Habermas in more than details. First, the governmental
action that unleashes the whole predicament, i.e., the war against
corruption, is not a response to external economic imperatives but rather to
a legitimacy problem. Though dishonesty in government may bog down
the economy, it typically gets major attention only when it hurts the state's
credibility and brings about a public outcry.

27.

Id. at 26.
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Figure 1. Legitimation Crisis: (i) Classical and (ii) Corruption Scenarios
Original 4

State Response 4

Legitimacy Gap 4

Normative Adjustment

(i) Economic Crisis

State Intervention

Beyond Laissez Faire

Welfare State Ideology

(ii) Corruption

Anti-Corruption

Beyond
Instrumentalism

Reflexive Politics

Dysfunction

I can illustrate this first point with Figure 1, which depicts the
structure of a legitimation crisis.
The original dysfunction, which
prototypically takes the form of an economic crisis, is a situation of
pervasive corruption. The state response is not compensatory intervention
in the economy but rather an anti-corruption campaign. My contention is
that the case at hand diverges from the paradigm not only in these
particulars, but also in that the original dysfunction already involves
legitimacy difficulties.
The second difference is that the state response is one that challenges
directly (not as a side effect) the community's normative selfinterpretation. In the first scenario, the state's actions purport to address
the initial complication and, incidentally, bring about a need for normative
readjustment. In the second, the solution to the original difficulty requires
a re-adaptation to begin with. Thus, eradicating systematic corruption
demands immediately transcending instrumentalism, and moving to a
reflexive approach to politics.
Figure 2. Corruption's Legitimacy Challenge
Systematic
Legitimacy
AntiCorruption "Deficit -Corruption

--

Radical
Re-Conceptualization
of Legitimacy

These considerations suggest a reconstructed model of the legitimacy
challenge presented by the problem of corruption. As represented in
Figure 2, a situation of systematic corruption leads directly to a legitimacy
deficit. Even under an instrumental conception of politics, rampant
corrupt practices pervert the political game and prevent people from taking
it seriously. The solution is a radical anti-corruption plan, which entails a
re-conceptualization of legitimacy. That is, in order to justify their
actions, political actors will have to show not that they generally abide by
the rules in pursuing their strategy, but rather that they normally treat
politics as an end in itself.
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LATIN AMERICAN CORRUPTION

So much for corruption generally. What about Latin American
corruption? Turning my attention to this region will force me, first, to
illustrate the general pronouncements I have already made. The theory
will thus have to descend to a more concrete plane. Second, in Latin
America the conceptual framework will have the opportunity of showing
its explanatory power. In particular, the notion of a legitimation crisis can
explicate the current Iberian American corruption problem while
distinguishing it from its previous incarnations. Finally, applying my
theoretical contemplation to the specific situation will enable me to make
some helpful modifications to my abstract model.
Political corruption is in fact part of a larger phenomenon, i.e., the
dichotomy between valid and effective law, which both Mexican legal
scholar Jorge Witker and Argentine legal philosopher Ernesto Garz6n
Vald6s have posited as characteristic of Latin American law.28 What they
mean is that the law on the books diverges from the law on the streets.
Constitutions, for instance, promise all sorts of rights, which citizens
rarely enjoy in practice.
Similarly, the law commands government
officials to act in a certain way, yet they will often either do the opposite
when appropriately bribed, or condition their performance on an
extortionate fee.
It is depressing to think that Witker identifies this bifurcation of law
and reality as a defining feature of Latin American law in 1975, whereas
Garz6n Valdrs does the same on his own in 1997. The evils of corruption,
in particular, seem as present today as twenty years ago. Has there been
absolutely no progress in two decades? "Plus qa change, plus c'est la
mame chose?" The more things change the more they remain the same?
I will argue that there is a key difference between the past and the
present experience of corruption. I will maintain that what distinguishes
today's corruption is precisely the fact that it is accompanied by a sense of
crisis. Yet, I will first take on the contention that the phenomenon not
only is exactly the same throughout, but also should not be a source of
concern. In this way, I will be able to precise further the notion of a
legitimacy deficit and how it bears on the issue of corruption.

28. See Jorge Witker Velhisquez, Derecho,desarrolloyformaci6n juridica,2 ANUARIO JURfDICO,
INSTITUTO DE INVESTIGACIONES JURIDICAs 295, 299-300 (1975); Ernesto Garz6n Vaidds, Eine
kritische Analyse der Funktionen des Rechts in Lateinamerika, 23 IBEROAMERIKANISCHES ARCHIV.
ZEITSCHRIFT FOR SOZIALWISSENSCHAFTEN UND GESCHICHTE, (Neue Folge) 321, 323-24 (1997).
29. See Luis A. Ortiz-Alvarez & Jacqueline Lejarza, Estudio preliminar: constituciones
latinoamericanas. Nuevas tendencias, cardcter normativo e interpretaci6n constitucional,
CONSTITUCIONES LAT1NOAMERICANAS 9, 11-12 (1997).

1999]

CORRUPTION AND LEGITIMATION CRISES IN LATINAMERICA

Inasmuch as corruption seems to be a way of life in Iberian America,
some might suggest not getting too worked up about the issue. Perhaps
"corrupt" practices simply perform a different role in Latin America than
in the North Atlantic world. Maybe they are just part of an informal tax
system, or they function similarly to paid consulting services. Is it not the
case that underpaid police officers often take bribes to raise their salaries
when the system is unable to do so due to inefficiency or insensitivity? Is
there really a significant difference between a graft payment demanded by
a well-placed government official and the fees charged by a consultant
when both are performing essentially the same service? Are both not
simply helping a corporation obtain the necessary authorization from high
up? Can it be that the anti-corruption clamor in Latin America is just the
product of excessive moralizing, or of an attempt to apply Western
concepts in a remote context?
A sanctimonious attitude may, to be sure, preclude a clearheaded
analysis of the causes, workings, and consequences of governmental
dishonesty. The discussion should therefore not end with the crucial
observation that under conditions of pervasive corruption those with
access to power benefit at the expense of everybody else. There is,
furthermore, no denying that corruption operates differently in Latin
America than it does in developed countries. Realizing how corrupt acts
in Latin America parallel perfectly legal practices farther north is indeed
helpful in gaining a critical understanding of Latin American corruption as
well as of North Atlantic legality.
One should nonetheless keep in mind that corruption, when epidemic
instead of episodic, generally impairs the state's functionality and
legitimacy. I will first address the functional impediments. A society sets
up political and legal institutions with an eye to realizing certain
objectives.
If these institutions operate randomly because of the
dishonesty of their personnel, they will not be able to attain these goals. If
their overall organization is even minimally rational, this kind of distortion
is detrimental to the community. As an example of dysfunctional
corruption, one may think of a transportation agency that is in charge of
developing a subway system and is unable to complete some of the lines
because officials embezzle the funds.
Political corruption renders the government deficient not only
functionally, but also from the standpoint of legitimacy. When the state is
corrupt, the rule of law and democracy suffer. The polity's capacity to act
with legality and autonomy diminishes. A community honors the notion
of legality, when it applies its norms in a consistent and principled
manner. It is autonomous, when it gives itself the law by which it lives.
Corruption implies, on the one hand, an arbitrary implementation of norms
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and, on the other hand, an adoption of norms that do not faithfully reflect
the people's will. The law state and the democratic state may gradually
collapse.
When legal precepts establish, for instance, that government contracts
will go to the best bid, the rule of law requires the consideration of all
bidders equally and objectively. The winner should be she who makes the
least expensive proposal while meeting the previously specified quality
criteria. If the decision-makers instead choose an undeserving contractor
who has advanced a payment under the table or demand an extortionate
fee in order to approve the most meritorious project, they are acting
capriciously and not in accordance with the principle of legality.
In the same example, the assumption is that the legal norm expresses
the general will. If the state officials conduct themselves as expected, they
will be serving as vehicles through which the community governs itself.
The community has decided that it will do business with those who offer it
the most advantageous deal and, through its public servants, it does so.
When its agents let money influence the process and ignore the preestablished parameters, it ends up under the coercion of precepts someone
else has foisted upon it.
Latin American governments, to be sure, are already functionally and
legitimately handicapped to some degree. They are often inefficient and
unethical. Insofar as they are even minimally functional and legitimate,
however, political corruption represents a loss. Moreover, it is precisely
the culture of corruption that, to a significant extent, renders them
dysfunctional and illegitimate. It is therefore inappropriate to treat
government dishonesty as simply a curious feature of Iberian American
countries.
As previously noted, corruption is not really a constant in recent Latin
American history. The manifestations of this phenomenon have changed
over time. They were different twenty years ago than they are today.
Being aware of this evolution is key to understanding corruption and to
finding a solution to the problem.
I have already pointed out that what is new is the sense of crisis. Yet,
why does there seem to be a crisis now when corruption has been a Latin
American tradition for so long? I do not mean, of course, to insinuate that
corruption and the broader disjunction between valid and effective law
represented no problem twenty years ago. What I am saying is that the
difficulties appear to take a different form today. They now have the feel
of a legitimation crisis. The threat seems to be no longer simply to system
integration, but also to social integration. Political corruption appears to
incapacitate not only the government's functionally, but its legitimacy as
well.
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Where does this change come from? It is tempting to search for an
explication in the fact that twenty years ago corruption took place within
the bounds of a paternalistic over-expanding state, whereas now there is a
minimalist evanescing state in place. This contrast is relevant, as I will
point out later on, but is not, in my opinion, the decisive factor. Instead,
the key distinction is that today the move towards democracy is
widespread throughout Latin America. With the exception of Cuba and
Puerto Rico, the nations of the region appear to be in the process of
erecting systems in which political decision making takes place
democratically. Needless to say, how far down this path each country has
gone varies immensely. Yet, at present, Latin American regimes across
the board must secure legitimacy for their actions. In the past, they could
in many cases simply resort to force. This option seems more and more to
be unavailable.
So, government dishonesty in Latin America now leads to the
legitimacy deficit that set the crisis process in motion. Twenty years ago,
when dictatorships were predominant in the region, the consequence was
mostly a shortage of functionality. The authoritarian states were often
willing to put up with this deficiency. Naturally, they also lost legitimacy
points. They distanced themselves from the ideal of legality. Yet, they
generally did not depend on their claim to legitimacy to stay in power.
They could conduct themselves arbitrarily, and coerce their citizens into
compliance when necessary. Furthermore, because they never seriously
pretended to serve the community's autonomy, the democratic deficit
associated with political corruption was pretty much beside the point.
In this day and age, with the advent of Latin American democracy,
rampant corrupt practices lead to legitimacy insufficiencies that can be
lethal. When Iberian American democracies fall prey to increased
arbitrariness, their precious claim to legality erodes. Their concurrent
deterioration towards heteronomy implies at least a partial abdication of
their democratic status. All the same, today they may not resort to force as
readily and openly as they did in the past in order to make up for the
justification gap.
An explanation along these lines is clearly incomplete. Although the
democratic revival means that the states must rely on rational legitimation
rather than on shared tradition - or even violence - to obtain their citizens'
loyalty, it does not in itself point to a crisis. Actually, as anticipated by the
paradigm introduced in the previous section, the crisis derives from the
need for an identity-threatening radical transformation, not from minor
adjustments to come to terms with systematic political corruption. Iberian
American countries are in this predicament because they generally operate
with an inadequate conception of government.
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In fact, the democratization process in Latin America has been highly
deficient for the most part. The understanding of politics that is emerging
in the region is overly instrumental. Political actors play the democracy
game strategically instead of engaging in genuine democratic interaction.
The oligarchies in power realize that they must win elections in order to
live on. They undertake grand publicitary efforts, often devoid of real
content, to capture votes. The end result is not a real development but
rather a trivialization of the democratic process. On this point, the U.S.
influence seems to have been pernicious.
Under these circumstances, the state can barely arrogate to itself the
legitimacy it so vitally needs. It perpetuates itself not on the basis of
publicly defended and defensible reasons, but instead through
propagandistic manipulation and sometimes through force. Of course, I
am exaggerating and caricaturizing a bit here. Nonetheless, the political
ascent of Fernando Henrique Cardoso in Brazil and Carlos Menem in
Argentina - let alone that of Alberto Fujimori in Peru - is attributable
more to clever politicking and advertisement than to an authentically
democratically advocated political program. Even the Revolutionary
Institutional Party - the PRI - in Mexico has figured out that it can

exchange images instead of cash for ballots and thus preserve its political
hegemony without openly and deliberately confronting the grave problems
affecting the nation.
In setting in motion their "neo-liberal" agendas - i.e., those based on
trickle down economics - Iberian American states have sidestepped any
seriously democratic debate. The dismantling of the bare-bones welfare
administration that had emerged over the years and the euphoric
privatization campaigns have taken place without a profound, communitywide consultation. More to the point, the old "corruptocracy" has learned
quickly how to adjust and cash in on the new political programs.
Latin America faces a general legitimacy gap due first and foremost
to the perversion of the democratic ideal, but also to the undermining of
the rule of law and the solidarity ideal. Political corruption aggravates the
normative deficiency by pushing Latin American societies even farther
away from the principles not only of autonomy and legality, but also, as I
will note below, of equality. Within this atmosphere, anti-corruption
efforts seem to be useless. State officials find ways of dodging the
proscriptions or sanctions. Often, those in charge of enforcement are
already - or become - part of the corruption nightmare.

Thus interpreted, Latin American corruption does fit the legitimation
crisis model sketched earlier. Systematic corruption leads to a legitimacy
deficit in the form of the collapse of the rule of law, on the one hand, and
genuine democracy, on the other hand. Because of the instrumental
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interpretation of politics in place, ordinary anti-corruption mechanisms are
insufficient.
Notice how within this strategic conception of government, the claim
to legitimacy is weak from the outset. Public servants already carry
themselves somewhat arbitrarily and without enough regard for the
general will. Nonetheless, pervasive corruption further undermines the
state's legitimacy. The end result may be not just an altered set of
effective norms, but a wholly different kind of game. Public and, even
more importantly, private citizens may finally simply refuse to play
altogether.
At any rate, the survival of these communities is on the line. If they
do nothing, they could very well perish as integrated collectivities. What
they need to do to subsist is reinvent the premises of their social unity.
That is, they must move from an instrumental to a reflexive understanding
of their political culture. They have to conduct themselves thoroughly
according to the principles of legality and autonomy. They must,
consequently, re-conceptualize their legitimacy. Yet, if they succeed in
transforming themselves in this way, they might well not be able to
recognize themselves. Their dilemma is that, whereas the present situation
may be unsustainable, the future prospect may turn out to be alienating.
Their challenge is simultaneously to re-construct and re-imagine
themselves.
Reflecting on how this large-scale metamorphosis would unfold in
Latin America makes it evident that the concept of legitimacy will have to
expand beyond the principles of legality and autonomy to incorporate that
of solidarity. Iberian American nations have failed to complete the
creation not only of the law state and the democratic state but also of the
social state. The political and economic reforms of the last decade and a
half have not sufficed to eliminate systematic arbitrariness or heteronomy
and have, in some ways, even increased inequality. Political corruption,
for its part, brings about arbitrariness and heteronomy directly, while it
entrenches inequality indirectly. It has this indirect effect because it
typically works like a regressive tax. It usually benefits individuals with
contacts in the spheres of influence, who are usually better off, at the
expense of everybody else, particularly of the poor. As Latin America
evolves toward a reflexive conception of politics and a new reading of
legitimacy, it will come closer to the three ideals: legality, autonomy, and
solidarity.
Combating government dishonesty through the broader
approach, i.e., through an overall shift from instrumentalism to reflexivity,
is a significant part of this process of evolution.
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Figure 3. Dimensions of Legitimacy
State Conception

Action Principle

Contrary Principle

Overarching Ideal

(i) Democratic State

Autonomy

Heteronomy

Democracy

(ii) Social State

Equality

Inequality

Solidarity

(iii) Law State

Legality

Arbitrariness

Rule of Law

In my discussion of legitimacy, I have been referring to three
dimensions. Each of them comes with a set of related principles, ideals
and visions of the state. For the sake of clarity and completeness, Figure 3
spells out the conceptual apparatus. To be legitimate a state must, first of
all, be democratic. It has to act according to the principle of autonomy,
i.e., it must be the means through which the community self-legislates. It
must, to turn to the other side of the coin, avoid placing its citizens in a
position of heteronomy. Obviously, its overarching ideal has to be that of
democracy. It needs, moreover, to function as a social state. It has to
promote equality, guided by the ideal of solidarity. Finally, it must be a
law state, which follows the principle of legality and avoids arbitrariness.
Its global goal in this sense has to be that of the rule of law.
The question remains, of course, how it is that Latin America can
reach the reflexive approach to politics and the new conception of
legitimacy and thus create a better environment in which to combat
corruption. The solution is to embed ideals such as democracy, the rule of
law, and solidarity in the constitutional texts and practices. The devil, as
usual, is in the details. I will only make a few general suggestions,
keeping in mind that the trajectory will ineluctably be arduous, uncertain,
and nonlinear.
The democratic process should focus on allowing the citizenry to
govern itself. Candidates for office should prevail on the basis of the
objective appeal of their programs - i.e., of how much the community can
freely make their agenda its own - not of how well they play the game of
politics. Money should, therefore, have much less influence on the
outcome, which would probably require limiting campaign spending to a
pre-established amount paid by the state.
There should be strict
restrictions on the extent to which the winners are able to reward their
supporters with positions in public service.
These last two suggestions would undoubtedly also advance the
principle of legality. To advance further in the same direction, state
officials should receive a decent wage, so that they are better able to fulfill
their duties in a principled and honest fashion. Government should, at any
rate, operate more transparently at all levels. The public sphere should
become stronger, through government funding of private groups and
initiatives.
Citizens would then have the possibility of engaging
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themselves more directly in the self-determination process, and of
monitoring the work of their representatives and public servants.
Education should improve in order to empower all individuals, not
only politically - but also socially. Thus, individuals would be capable of
enlightened political and civic engagement as well as of economic and
existential flourishing. The goal of solidarity inevitably would also call
for income redistribution and a welfare safety net. Latin American society
should specifically take pains not to leave the poor or minority groups
behind. It should equip the traditionally disadvantaged to contribute
meaningfully to social, political, and economic progress.
In addition to these reforms at the national level, international
institutions should emerge that are also committed to the principles of
legality, autonomy, and equality.
Consequently, the current Latin
American integration movements should focus not only on economic, but
also on legitimacy norms. Transnational structures should have the
authority and the capacity to enforce these norms effectively.
Severe sanctions and anti-corruption laws, on the national and
international plane, will naturally always play an important role. They
will, however, be all the more successful, the more Latin America
approaches a new conception of politics and legitimacy through the kind
of broad measures just outlined. My main point is that, inasmuch as Latin
American corruption has brought about a legitimation crisis, the only way
out is precisely a radical transformation of the premises of collective
existence.
VI. CONCLUSION
I have now closed the circle. My discussion set off from the idea of a
crisis and then entered into the more specific notion of a legitimation
crisis. I then explained how political corruption may entail this kind of a
predicament. Finally, I construed Latin American corruption in terms of a
legitimacy crisis. The Leninist reconstruction of the original concept is
thus complete.
Much more work remains. The theoretical constructs need further
elaboration and precision. I have, moreover, only scratched the surface of
what the practical consequences might be. The central task at this point is
probably the development of a program that creatively breathes life into
abstract ideals such as the rule of law, democracy, and solidarity.
Most Latin American nations have, of course, already constitutionally
committed to these goals. Nevertheless, they have barely started out
towards effective implementation. The divergence between valid and
effective law is immense at a time in which these communities'
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subsistence depends on a convergence. My contention is that there has not
been sufficient understanding of these guiding notions or of the kind of
metamorphosis that their full realization demands.
The Latin American corruption crisis explodes with the legitimacy
deficit produced by rampant government dishonesty. Iberian American
societies are, more importantly, incapable of stopping their own decline
into arbitrariness, heteronomy, and inequality without undergoing a
vertiginous transmutation process. Ordinary measures and the usual anticorruption tactics are hopeless. Furthermore, naked state violence as a
means of shoring up the allegiance or at least the obedience of the
citizenry has ceased to be a real alternative. The only survival option is,
therefore, for these communities to gather the courage to reinvent
themselves. They must regenerate their democratic potential, move
towards a more substantive and less instrumental model of democracy,
and come up with appropriate legislation and enforcement mechanisms.
More broadly, they must build a political and legal structure capable of
sustaining not only a genuinely democratic state, but also a law state and a
social state.
This ambition is, as already admitted, more easily promulgated than
realized. Yet, I remain optimistic that democracy - even when highly
defective - cannot defy its own logic. It is inescapably reflexive and
therefore cannot bracket out meta-questions about its premises or about
the framework in which it unfolds. Nor can it shut off reflection on its
connections to the principles of legality and equality. Latin American
peoples, consequently, must simply persevere, with honesty and courage,
in their effort to open up politically. If they do so, they will hopefully be
able to visualize a new democratic horizon and come to see themselves
reflected in it.

